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This article argues that environmental issues confront us as an ongoing emergency. The epistemic 
features of serious environmental issues – the fact that we cannot reliably distinguish ex ante between 
benign policy choices and choices that may lead to environmental catastrophe – are the same features of 
an emergency. This means that, like emergencies, environmental issues pose a fundamental challenge for 
the rule of law: they reveal the necessity of unconstrained executive discretion. Discretion is widely 
lamented as a fundamental flaw in Canadian environmental law, which undermines both environmental 
protection and the rule of law itself. Through the conceptual framework of the environmental emergency, 
this article offers a critique of the current understanding of discretion in environmental law and suggests 
how an alternative conception of the rule of law can both constitute and constrain the state’s regulative 
authority over the environment.  
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“Our planet’s health and its capacity to function for the journey through time are now deeply 
imperilled. We stand on the brink of climate catastrophe.”1 
I. Introduction 
 For decades environmental law scholars have grappled with the apparent limits of law in 
improving environmental protection. Scholars offer a wide variety of explanations for the 
perceived impotence of environmental law ranging from its anthropocentric character,2 its lack 
of reflexivity,3 or more generally, its immaturity.4 One leading environmental law scholar 
describes environmental law as “hot law” because it concerns situations in which “the agreed 
frames, legal and otherwise, for how we understand and act in the world are in a constant state of 
flux and contestation.”5 This article takes up this challenge of understanding both the promise 
and limits of law in governing the environment. Its central argument is that the challenge that 
environmental issues pose for law is best understood as the challenge that emergencies pose for 
law. This is because, like emergencies, environmental issues require decisions to be taken under 
conditions of profound epistemic frailty, where the chance of catastrophe cannot be reliably 
eliminated in advance. 
 
                                                            
1 David Spratt & Philip Sutton, Climate Code Red: The Case for Emergency Action (Brunswick, Vic: Scribe 
Publications, 2008) at 144. 
2 Jane Holder, “New Age: Rediscovering Natural Law” (2000) 53Current Legal Problems 151 at 166-7. 
3 Eric W Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Nw U L Rev 1227, Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, "Towards a Critical Environmental Law" In A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ed, Law and Ecology: 
New Environmental Foundations (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011) 18. 
4 Elizabeth Fisher et al, “Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship” 
(2009) 21 J Envtl L 213 (discussing the perceived immaturity of environmental law), DP Emond."“ Are We There 
Yet?” Reflections on the Success of the Environmental Law Movement in Ontario"(2008) 46 OHLJ 219 at 222. 
5 Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental Law as ‘Hot’ Law” (2013) 25 J Envtl L 347 at 347-8 (internal footnote omitted). 
See also Michael M’Gonigle, Paula Ramsey, “Greening Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Re-
Formation” (2004) 14 JELP 333. 
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The specific context of the article is administrative law, which covers a vast range of 
environmental decision-making in Canada. Understanding environmental issues as an ongoing 
emergency offers a novel and comprehensive perspective on both environmental decision-
makers and the institutions that oversee the exercise of their administrative authority. We will 
see that administrative law requirements are a primary concern of many Canadian environmental 
law scholars who are rightly concerned about the use of administrative discretion to undermine 
environmental protection. Approaching environmental law from the emergency perspective 
reveals that existing accounts have identified the symptom (discretion) without yet fully 
confronting the much deeper theoretical problem that environmental issues pose for governing 
through law. This paper advances an understanding of the rule of law – one built on common law 
reasoning – that is capable of providing meaningful legal constraints on environmental decision-
making.   
 
The account of environmental law offered in this article – an account of ‘the 
environmental emergency’ – emerges from environmental thinking itself. Environmentalists are 
often accused of being ‘alarmists,’6 ‘doomsayers,’7 ‘radicals,’8 and ‘extremists’9 in the 
increasingly polarized debates surrounding serious environmental issues. The “carbon bomb”10 
                                                            
6 Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist's Guide to Global Warming (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
2007). Lomborg calls the language in the epigraph “catastrophespeak” and argues that this “hyperbole” inhibits “a 
sensible dialogue on the political and economic arguments for action.” 
7 Frank B Cross, "The Naive Environmentalist" (2002) 53 Case W Res L Rev 477 at 478. 
8 Comments by Joe Oliver, then Federal Minister of Natural Resources in anticipation of the Joint Review Panel on 
the Northern Gateway Pipeline: Joe Oliver, “An open letter from Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver” Globe and 
Mail (2 January, 2012) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/an-open-letter-
from-natural-resources-minister-joe-oliver/article4085663/>. 
9 “How to spot an environmental extremist” Ethical Oil (27 September 2011), online: Ethical Oil 
<http://www.ethicaloil.org/news/how-to-spot-an-environmental-extremist/>. 
10 “Carbon bomb” refers specifically to Alberta’s oil sands. See Bill McKibben, quoted in “U.S. Climate Protests 
Shift to Blocking Keystone XL Pipeline Approval” Reuters (27 June 2011) online: Reuters 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/27/idUS323166223820110627>. 
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has replaced the notorious “population bomb,”11 and, as reflected in the epigraph, current 
environmental ‘alarmists’ are now fixated on catastrophic climate change. The language of 
environmental catastrophe is often grounded in genuinely perceived threats, but it is also often 
used as a deliberate strategy to mobilize a complacent public and push for environmental reform. 
This article argues that it is worth taking these claims seriously – not because they are 
necessarily correct, nor to provoke political action — but for the purpose of better understanding 
how environmental decisions can be made in accordance with principles of a democratic society 
governed by the rule of law. For this reason, the concept of the environmental emergency should 
be of interest to both environmental law scholars and public law scholars more generally. Not 
only does this framework offer insight into existing approaches in Canadian environmental law, 
it also shows that environmental issues – like emergencies – can force us to re-examine our 
‘agreed legal frames.’ We will see that the environmental emergency has important implications 
for understanding how creative institutional design can allow for the realization of the rule of law 
in complex decision-making contexts.  
 
  The article proceeds in three main parts. Part II makes the argument that environmental 
issues can be understood as constituting an ongoing emergency, from the perspective of the 
challenge they pose for the rule of law. The problem emergencies pose for the rule of law is 
fundamental and, unlike most topics in environmental law, has a long history in political and 
legal theory. At its most basic, the emergency is a sudden and extreme event, defined here as an 
unforeseeable, extreme threat.12 I argue that environmental issues possess these constitutive 
features due to their complexity and indeterminacy and thus pose the same kind of challenge to 
                                                            
11 Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968). 
12 Part II.A. infra. 
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the rule of law. We will see that the problem of emergencies — including the environmental 
emergency — is that their unforeseeable and potentially catastrophic nature necessitates 
unconstrained executive discretion. It is this key observation that is at odds with a position taken 
by many legal scholars seeking to enhance environmental protection in Canada. I refer to this as 
the environmental reform position and we will see that it portrays administrative discretion as 
inherently objectionable – not only a threat to environmental protection but also a threat to the 
rule of law itself.  
 
Part III of the article builds on the emergency framework to diagnose the ‘problem’ of 
discretion identified by the environmental reform position. In this section, I argue that 
emergencies prompt us to reconsider our most basic assumptions about law, discretion, and what 
it means to govern in accordance with the rule of law. I use Carl Schmitt’s challenge, the 
challenge to show how emergencies can be governed by law, as a starting point for unpacking 
the core assumptions about the ability of law to constrain emergency powers. We will see that 
the emergency challenge is to a formal conception of the rule of law, which presumes the 
legislature is the only legitimate source of legal norms and is therefore undermined by executive 
discretion. In order to preserve the formal conception, judges, when faced with the exercise of 
discretionary authority, will create either ‘legal black holes’ or ‘legal grey holes,’ where 
discretion is governed by the rule of law only in the thinnest sense of formal compliance with 
validly enacted legislation. Using these concepts of legal black and grey holes, I demonstrate the 
persistence of the formal conception in Canadian environmental law, which validates the 
environmental reform position’s concern that discretionary environmental decisions are not 
subject to robust legal constraints. 
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In Part IV, I canvas possible responses to the environmental emergency. I first address 
the solutions that follow from the environmental reform position – stricter ex ante legal rules and 
delegation to an independent expert decision-maker. But since these solutions are also products 
of the formal conception of the rule of law, we will see they cannot offer a solution to the 
environmental reform position’s concern. I then introduce an account of common law 
constitutionalism, which understands rule of law constraints as “the constraints of adequate 
justification.”13 We will see that common law constitutionalism suggests that creative 
institutional design can allow all public decisions to be subject to meaningful rule-of-law 
constraints, even in the highly complex and unpredictable context of the environmental 
emergency. 
II. The Environmental Emergency 
This part introduces the argument that the challenge that environmental issues pose to law is 
best understood as the challenge of emergencies. We will see that, by ‘environmental 
emergency,’ I do not mean any event, or series of events – extreme weather, earthquakes or the 
like – since these are emergencies in a conventional sense. Rather, this Part argues that the core 
problem of (conventional) emergencies focuses our attention on the systemic features of 
environmental issues that emerge from the complex, adaptive nature of ecological systems. 
Before undertaking this argument, however, I will first set out the constitutive features of 
emergencies and introduce the challenge they pose to the rule of law, which sets the stage for the 
argument that follows. Relying on an example of an unprecedented insect epidemic in Western 
                                                            
13 David Dyzenhaus, "Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's Conception of Legal Culture" (1998) 14 S Afr J on 
Hum Rts 11at 30 [‘Justification’].  
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Canada, I then argue that these emergency features inhere in environmental issues as well. In the 
last section, we will see that this concept of the environmental emergency conflicts with a 
dominant position in Canadian environmental law, the environmental reform position. 
A. The Emergency Framework 
Emergencies, in particular national security emergencies, have moved to the centre stage of 
public law post-9/11.14 This literature is extensive and addresses numerous vexed questions that 
centre on both the controversial substance of emergency response powers and also how to ensure 
that the exercise of these powers remain subject to meaningful rule-of-law constraints, such as 
due process.15 Much of this literature has been framed explicitly in response to a controversial 
legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, who wrote in the Weimar period, but whose work has again risen to 
prominence in the contemporary emergency literature.16  
 
Schmitt argues that the emergency cannot be governed by law. He describes the emergency 
as an unforeseeable, existential threat that cannot be anticipated in law.17 Schmitt argues that the 
emergency reveals the necessity of unconstrained executive discretion, since the emergency and 
its response cannot be anticipated through positive legal norms.18 Where the state faces a truly 
existential threat, Schmitt argues that the sovereign (or the modern day executive) may need to 
                                                            
14 Oren Gross, "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?" (2003) 112 Yale 
LJ 1011 [‘Chaos’] at 1011. 
15 For an excellent cross-section of these debates see Victor Ramraj ed, Emergencies and the Limits of Legality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 2008).  
16 David Dyzenhaus, "The Permanence of the Temporary - Can Emergency Powers Be Normalized?" R J Daniels, P 
Macklem, K Roach eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001) 21, Bruce Ackerman, "The Emergency Constitution" (2004) 113 Yale LJ 1029 [Ackerman], 
Sanford Levinson, "Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency" (2005) 40 Ga L. Rev 699 [Levinson], 
Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Terror], 
Chaos, supra note 14. 
17 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans by G Schwab (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985) at 6 [Schmitt]. 
18 Ibid. at 6-7. 
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suspend legal order altogether,19 but the fact that the sovereign is so empowered reveals that it is 
in the position to respond the most expeditiously to serious, though not existential threats.20 In 
the face of an unforeseeable and extreme emergency, Schmitt argues, the sovereign can do 
whatever is necessary to bring the crisis to an end; executive discretion cannot be constrained by 
law. 
 
Schmitt’s work, though extreme and unsettling for most legal scholars, seemed to offer an 
explanation for the sweeping executive action taken by the United States in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.21 The challenge for most legal scholars writing after 9/11 was to show that the 
American emergency response was not, as Schmitt would have predicted, inevitable. They 
sought to show that Schmitt was wrong in his assumptions about law and its ability to constrain 
emergency power.22 Schmitt’s question, then, is a question of the first order. Simply put, there is 
no point in debating the appropriateness of particular legal measures in times of crisis, if Schmitt 
is correct that emergency powers cannot be governed by law.  
 
Schmitt’s definition of the emergency, however, has proven much less controversial. 
Constitutional law scholars accept the basic terms of Schmitt’s challenge: to show how law can 
govern the response to an extreme and unforeseeable threat.23 The core challenge posed by an 
                                                            
19 Ibid. at 12. 
20 Posner and Vermeule take up this point in Eric A Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 32-33 [Unbound].  
21 The President declared a state of emergency, and authorized indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay, ‘advanced 
interrogation tactics’ and warrantless spying all initially through unilateral executive action: Kent Roach, The 9/11 
Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 4.  
22 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 
2006) at 34-5, 40 [Constitution]; Ackerman, supra note 16; Levinson, supra note 16. 
23 If anything constitutional law scholars have relaxed the threshold for what constitutes an emergency. Schmitt 
focused on a truly existential threat, but the prevalence of Schmitt’s challenge in the post-9/11 literature suggests 
that something less than an existential threat can constitute an emergency, given that, as dramatic as terror attacks of 
the last two decades have been, they have not been existential threats. Furthermore, the basic problem that 
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emergency arises from two epistemic features: a lack of ex ante knowledge about the specific 
events that may produce an emergency, and a lack of ex ante knowledge about how to respond to 
such an unforeseen event. These features could arise where the state faces a political or national-
security threat – as Schmitt argues – but, as we will see, these features inhere in environmental 
issues as well.  
B. The Challenge of Environmental Issues 
The argument that the key emergency features inhere in environmental issues follows, in 
short, from the current scientific understanding of ecological systems as complex, adaptive 
systems. Ecosystems are comprised of myriad intricate and indeterminate relationships, between 
humans, plants, animals, and the abiotic components of the environment, such as the climate. 
These relationships are themselves adaptive, or changing over time, which makes predicting the 
impacts of our actions on the environment extremely difficult. Complex, adaptive systems are 
characterized by two phenomena. The first is indeterminacy,24 or the fact that ecosystems are 
comprised of non-linear dynamics, which are vastly different than the direct, linear and causal 
linkages that can be determined in a scientific laboratory.25 In fact, their relationships are so 
complex they are incompressible, meaning that the “simplest model is the process itself [and t]he 
only way to determine the future of the system is to run it: there are no shortcuts.”26 Even when 
ecological relationships are well understood, the most minuscule errors in measurement can 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
emergencies pose for law can be traced back to John Locke, Second Treatise of Government at §§ 159-160. Chaos, 
supra note 14, offers a nice overview of how a core understanding of the emergency permeates political and legal 
theory. 
24 Brian Wynne, "Uncertainty and Environmental Learning" (1992) 2 Global Environmental Change 111 at 114. 
25 Crawford S Holling, "Resilience and stability of ecological systems" (1973) 4 Annual review of ecology and 
systematics 1; K Mickelson & WE Rees, "The Environment: Ecological and Ethical Dimensions" in EL Hughes, AR 
Lucas, WA Tilleman eds, Environmental Law and Policy 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 
2003) 1 at 9 [Mickelson & Rees]. 
26 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, “Complexity and Uncertainty A Prudential Approach to Nanotechnology” in Health and 
Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European Commission, Nanotechnologies: A Preliminary Risk 
Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in Brussels on 1–2 March 2004 (European Commission, 2004) 71 at 
81. 
  11 
cause drastically inaccurate predictions because of the non-linear dynamics of the system.27 The 
second phenomenon is the relatively high chance of an extreme event, or tipping point, that 
dramatically and unexpectedly changes the dynamics of the system. Extreme events – such as 
large hurricanes, earthquakes or pest outbreaks – occur with surprising frequency28 and can 
disrupt the system such that it does not return to its prior state.29 
 
 One example of the complex, adaptive nature of ecosystems and their potential for an 
unknown, extreme event is the ongoing unprecedented mountain pine beetle epidemic in western 
Canada. It is the second largest insect epidemic in North American history.30 The beetle has 
decimated the lodgepole pine population across the province of British Columbia.31 At times the 
beetles travelled in such density that they could be seen as a light drizzle on weather radar, and 
“fell like rain out of the sky.”32 The mountain pine beetle now covers an unprecedented range, 
extending well into the neighbouring province of Alberta. Moreover, having overrun its historic 
host, the beetle has begun to attack new species which, for the first time, makes the entire pan-
Canadian boreal forest susceptible to attack.33 The epidemic is a natural disaster, albeit not a 
conventional one, analogized by one author to a slow-moving tsunami.34  
 
                                                            
27 Daniel A Farber, "Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty" (2003) 37 
UC Davis L. Rev. 145 [Farber] at 153; Mickelson & Rees, supra note 25 at 9. 
28 Farber, supra note 27 at 153-4. 
29 Mickelson & Rees, supra note 25 at10. 
30 Andrew Nikiforuk, Empire of the Beetle (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2011) [Empire] at 55. 
31 By 2012 it had killed 53% of all commercially viable pine in the province: A History of the Battle Against the 
Mountain Pine Beetle (Government of British Columbia, 2012) at 3, online 
<http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/mountain_pine_beetle/Pine%20Beetle%20Response%20Brief%20History%20May%
2023%202012.pdf > [History]. 
32 Empire, supra note 30 at 74. 
33 Ben Parfitt, Battling the Beetle: Taking Action to Restore British Columbia's Interior Forests (Vancouver: 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2005) at 16 [Battling]. 
34 Empire, supra note 30 at Chapter 3 “The Lodgepole Tsunami”, and at 74 (quoting the manager of a beetle action 
coalition, “It’s not something you’ve ever seen before. It’s like a tsunami that takes twenty-five years instead of two 
seconds.”). 
  12 
The epidemic will wreck havoc on the British Columbia forest industry, the province’s 
primary natural resource industry. It has killed vast areas of forest in the interior of British 
Columbia, turning the landscape red, then grey as the attacked trees die. The result has been a 
short-term boom of available timber which needs to be logged before it rots.35 Even still, the 
beetle is out-logging the loggers,36 meaning that around half of all lodgepole pine, deliberately 
managed for long-term harvesting, will not be available for harvest in 10 to 50 years time.37  
 
The possibility of catastrophe was not considered by decision-makers responsible for 
decades of forest management decisions preceding the beetle epidemic.38 Mountain pine beetle 
outbreaks are a regular occurrence in forests dominated by lodgepole pine,39 to be sure. But not 
on this scale. Although we now know that the combination of fire suppression40 and climate 
change41 were the main drivers of the epidemic, the complexity of ecological relationships makes 
it extremely difficult to know in advance how disparate forest management decisions may impact 
the beetle’s long-term population dynamics, let alone predict how those decisions may intersect 
with the yet-to-be-discovered phenomenon of climate change. Moreover, the ongoing dynamics 
                                                            
35 This is known as the timber’s “shelf-life” and is typically in the 10-15 year range, depending on local conditions: 
Forest Practices Board, Evaluating Mountain Pine Beetle Management in British Columbia (Victoria: Forest 
Practices Board, 2004) at 16 [Evaluating]. 
36 In some areas, by as much as 23 times: Empire, supra note 30 at 62 
37 Harry Nelson, "Does A Crisis Matter? Forest Policy Responses to the Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic in British 
Columbia" (2007) 55 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 459 at 463 [Nelson]. 
38 Forest management decisions were not initially made with lodgepole pine in mind: Roger J Whitehead, Les 
Safranyik and Terry L Shore, “Preventative Management” in Les Safranyik and Bill Wilson eds, The Mountain Pine 
Beetle: A Synthesis of Biology, Management and Impacts on Lodgepole Pine (Victoria: Pacific Forestry Centre, 
2006) 173 at 186. No forestry company had a management plan or lease provision accounting for beetle outbreaks: 
Empire, supra note 30 at 52. 
39 Evaluating, supra note 35 at 9. 
40 Fire suppression tripled the area covered by mature lodgepole pine: Kim McGarrity & George Hoberg, The Beetle 
Challenge: An Overview of the Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic and its Implications (Vancouver: Forest Policy 
Resources, University of British Columbia, 2005) at 4. Fire suppression is a basic, and uncontroversial forest 
management practice for maintaining timber yield: History, supra note 31 at 2. 
41 Historically, mountain pine beetle populations were kept in check by very cold weather — typically minus 35°C 
for several days. This type of weather event has not occurred in the British Columbia interior since the winter of 
1995/96. 
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of the beetle continue to defy prediction. “[T]he pine beetle did everything the experts said it 
couldn’t do: it flew over mountains, it invaded northern forests, it attacked spruce trees, and it 
wiped out pine plantations not much thicker in diameter than baseball bats.”42 
 
Indeterminacy poses a serious problem for environmental decision-making. It means that 
our understanding of the problem is necessarily incomplete and it will be difficult to predict the 
effects of our decisions on the environment.43 Moreover, indeterminacy means that both our 
understanding of the problem and the problem itself are constantly evolving. Environmental 
decisions are often made in a ‘no-analogue’ state,44 where past decisions are of limited 
usefulness because they were influenced by a host of complex interactions that have changed 
over time. For example, fire suppression decisions in the first half of the 20th century were not 
predictive of possible effects on the mountain pine beetle in the latter half of the century because 
never before had these management decisions intersected with climate change. 
 
This incomplete understanding poses an additional challenge because complex, adaptive 
systems also contain the relatively high probability of extreme events,45 which are also not 
always knowable in advance. Complex, adaptive systems are not accurately described by 
simplistic bell curve distributions, where the probability of severe events decays rapidly, 
allowing decision-makers to effectively ignore the possibility of extreme events that are ‘off the 
chart’. Rather, complex, adaptive systems are characterized by “fat tail probabilities,”46 meaning 
                                                            
42 Empire, supra note 30 at 57. 
43 JB Ruhl, "The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the 
Questions" (2007) 24 Pace Envtl L Rev 25 at 28 [Ruhl]. 
44 Arild Underdal, "Complexity and Challenges of Long-Term Environmental Governance" (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 386 at 388. 
45 Farber, supra note 27 at 152-5; Mickelson & Rees, supra note 25 at 9-10. 
46 Farber, supra note 27 at 155. 
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that extreme, even catastrophic events, occur with surprising frequency. Decision-makers cannot 
justifiably disregard the possibility of such extreme events.47 
 
The current mountain pine beetle is just that extreme event: a beetle epidemic so severe 
that it could not have been predicted by looking at the historical record of mountain pine beetle 
outbreaks, or indeed any prior insect outbreak in Canada. It is the unavoidable nasty surprise;48 
the unexpected outcome that we did not even know to look for when deciding to implement 
widespread fire suppression. The mountain pine beetle epidemic illustrates that, even when we 
have a decades-old approach to a problem with a seemingly sound grasp of its dimensions, 
extreme unforeseeable events still occur. Our necessarily incomplete understanding of ecological 
systems means that surprises — sometimes catastrophic surprises — are unavoidable. 
 
Our understanding of ecological systems as complex, adaptive systems means that the 
epistemic features of emergencies are inherent within all environmental issues. While it is 
certainly not the case that all environmental issues contain the possibility of an extreme event, or 
catastrophe, our inability to distinguish in advance the ones that contain this possibility from the 
ones that do not justifies viewing all environmental issues from this perspective. It is not possible 
to “carve out irreversible or catastrophic risks for special treatment,”49 since, as the beetle 
example illustrates, we cannot reliably identify these in advance. Moreover, the dynamics of 
complex systems mean that some of the most pernicious features of catastrophes, such as their 
                                                            
47 See, e.g., Douglas Kysar’s analysis of the risk assessment for hurricane protection proceeding Hurricane Katrina, 
which eliminated one of the most extreme hurricanes from the analysis as a statistical outlier: Douglas Kysar, 
Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2010) at 77 [Regulating]. 
48 Farber, supra note 27 at 167. 
49 Douglas A Kysar, "It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs" (2006) 22 J Land Use & Envtl L 
1 at 22. 
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irreversibility, “should be expected to characterize all decision nodes within complex adaptive 
systems.”50 In other words, what may, at the time of their making, seem like trivial or benign 
regulatory decisions, can in fact have irreversible environmental effects, even if their full impacts 
do not materialize until well into the future long past when anything can be done about it. Put 
differently, each environmental issue can be understood as an ‘emergency in miniature’51 where 
decisions must be taken under conditions of uncertainty, and where the possibility that this 
decision will be the one that triggers the catastrophe cannot be eliminated in advance. In this 
way, the concept of the environmental emergency reflects our current understanding of 
ecological systems, irrespective of the actual probability of a catastrophe or whether, in the end, 
it in fact occurs. It is our epistemic inability to distinguish benign from catastrophic policy 
choices that justifies viewing all relevant events and policies through the prism of the emergency 
paradigm.  
 
By building on this understanding of complex, adaptive ecological systems, the 
environmental emergency underscores the fact that environmental decisions are always taken 
under conditions of uncertainty. Even where environmental issues have received abundant 
scientific attention, unforeseen dimensions still arise. Daniel Bodansky argues that “many of 
today’s most serious problems were unanticipated and would probably not have been prevented 
even if regulators had chosen the cautious approach.”52 In other words, the challenge for 
environmental law is not simply acquiring and incorporating better environmental science, but 
                                                            
50 Ibid. 
51 Constitution, supra note 22 at 60. 
52 Daniel Bodansky, "Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle" (1991) 33 Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development 4 at 43. 
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coping with the complex features inherent in the issues themselves.53 The challenge, then, is to 
understand how the rule of law can operate under conditions of such profound uncertainty.  
C. The Environmental Reform Position 
Understanding environmental issues as an ongoing emergency means that environmental law 
faces the same basic challenge as the emergency context: the challenge of discretion. As we saw 
in section A, Schmitt argued that the emergency revealed the inevitable need for executive 
discretion, since the executive was best positioned to respond to the emergency. However, in 
reaching this conclusion, the environmental emergency conflicts with a dominant position in 
Canadian environmental law, the environmental reform position, which objects to the 
pervasiveness of discretion in Canadian environmental law. 
 
While the environmental reform position is not monolithic, its core attributes are shared 
amongst many Canadian environmental law scholars. In particular, environmental reformers 
lament the extent of administrative discretion that permeates Canadian environmental law. David 
Boyd calls environmental statutes “paper tigers”54 because their lofty goals are subtly but 
consistently undermined by discretionary ‘loopholes’ through which industry receives 
authorizations to pollute, degrade and harm the environment.55 Environmental reformers are 
                                                            
53 Douglas A Kysar, "Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality" (2004) 31 BC 
Envtl Aff L Rev 555 at 565. 
54 David Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2003) at 231 [Boyd].  
55 For additional examples of this critique see: Linda Nowlan, "CPR for Canadian Rivers -- Law to Conserve, 
Protect, and Restore Environmental Flows in Canada" (2012) 23 JELP 237 at 257, Bruce Pardy & Annette Stoehr, 
"The Failed Reform of Ontario's Mining Laws" (2012) 23 JELP 1 at 6, 13-14, and Emily Walter, "Decoding Codes 
of Practice: Approaches to Regulating the Ecological Impacts of Logging in British Columbia" (2005) 15 JELP 143 
at 156. 
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rightly concerned about the exercise of discretion in a way that undermines statutory objectives 
and contributes to Canada’s poor track record on environmental protection.56  
 
These concerns about discretion stem from the fact that it is often exercised to allow short-
term interests to trump long-term environmental protection.57 This observation is supported by 
numerous theories of regulation which argue that regulated industries are able to coordinate and 
advance their interests within the administrative process, whereas environmental interests are 
underrepresented due to their diffuse and often intangible nature.58 Moreover, regulators face 
both epistemic and resource constraints that require considerable cooperation from regulated 
parties both to provide relevant information and to comply with regulation in the absence of 
rigorous monitoring and enforcement.59 The significance of Canada’s natural resource industries 
in the Canadian economy has nurtured this cozy relationship between industry and government,60 
which, in turn, fuels a deep distrust of executive discretion by environmental reformers. 
 
Some reformers also argue that the extent of discretion in Canadian environmental 
undermines the rule of law itself.61 Bruce Pardy argues that environmental law “is one of the 
most extreme examples of legal disciplines in which the commitment to principles of 
                                                            
56 Ibid. at 5-10. My previous work has also assumed the environmental reform position for this reason: Shaun Fluker 
& Jocelyn Stacey, “The Basics of Species at Risk Legislation in Alberta” (2012) 50 Alta L Rev 95. 
57 Ibid. at 232, 237-8, 263. See also the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, where parties have filed dozens 
of petitions on Canada’s failure to enforce its environmental laws: 
<http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&ContentID=&SiteNodeID=546&BL_ExpandID=502Canada>. 
58 See Stephen P Croley, “Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process” (1998) 98 Columbia L 
Rev 1 at 32 ff for a nice overview of these theories as well as a critique of their weaknesses and an evaluation of 
their empirical support. 
59 D Paul Emond, "The Greening of Environmental Law" (1990) 36 McGill LJ 742 at 744-5. 
60 Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner, & Benjamin Richardson, "What Ever Happened to Canadian Environmental 
Law?" (2011) 37 Ecology L Q 981 at 1025.  
61 Lynda Collins, "Tort, Democracy and Environmental Governance: The Case of Non-Enforcement" (2007) 15 Tort 
L Rev 107 at 111 [Collins]. 
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predictability, abstraction, and separation of powers has been consistently abandoned….”62 
Pervasive administrative discretion means that significant environmental policymaking does not 
take place in the open legislature. Rather, as Lynda Collins observes, “crucial decisions 
regarding trade-offs between short-term economic gain and long-term harm to health and the 
environment are …made behind closed doors generally without the knowledge of the electorate, 
and therefore without accountability.”63  
 
Reformers further observe that environmental statutes lack specific and clear legal rules and, 
instead, set out broad objectives to ‘manage’ the environment while simultaneously maintaining 
or promoting natural resource development. This means that environmental decisions amount to 
“discretionary judgment calls,”64 where virtually any decision is defensible65 in light of the broad 
and potentially conflicting legislative objectives. Indeed, the environmental reform position 
highlights the fact that the courts provide an ineffective constraint on the exercise of discretion in 
environmental law. Environmental decisions are often not reviewable by the court or are 
reviewed on such a deferential basis that virtually any decision is legally permissible.66 The 
environmental reform position therefore concludes that executive decisionmakers are not 
effectively constrained by the rule of law. 
 
 The difficulty, which the environmental emergency reveals, is that administrative discretion 
is necessary not only to respond immediately to an urgent environmental catastrophe — to stem 
the tide of a mountain pine beetle epidemic, for example — but also to ensure that each 
                                                            
62 Bruce Pardy, "Environmental Assessment and Three Ways Not to Do Environmental Law" (2010) 21 JELP 139 at 
149 [‘EA’]. 
63 Collins, supra note 61 at 110-111. 
64 ‘EA,’supra note 61 at 149; Collins, supra note 61 at 111. 
65 ‘EA,’supra note 61 at 147. 
66 Boyd, supra note 54 at 269. 
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environmental decision reflects the best understanding of the invariably dynamic problem at 
hand. But this kind of profound discretion does not square easily with a traditional understanding 
of the rule of law, as reflected by the concerns of the environmental reform position. It means 
that the executive exercises significant policymaking authority, authority which is not effectively 
constrained by either ex ante legislative rules nor ex post judicial review. In these respects, the 
executive holds and exercises decision-making power in much the way Schmitt thinks that 
sovereigns must hold and exercise power to deal with national-security emergencies. As we shall 
now see, the challenge that emergencies pose for the rule of law is the best way to understand the 
problem we face in the environmental context. 
III. The ‘Problem’ of Discretion in Environmental Law 
 
This part builds on Schmitt’s challenge – the challenge to show how emergencies can be 
governed by law – in order to uncover our basic assumptions about law and its ability to 
constrain emergency powers. We will see that the real challenge in the emergency context arises 
from a formal conception of the rule of law, which equates law with rules enacted by the 
legislature. Drawing on the emergency literature, I argue that the formal conception is incapable 
of constraining emergency power because it makes no room for the exercise of administrative 
discretion. We will see that in the emergency context, a desire to preserve the formal conception 
of the rule of law, leads judges to find legal black holes — where statutes attempt to exempt the 
executive from legal constraints67 — and grey holes — where there are some constraints on 
                                                            
67 Constitution, supra note 51 at 3. The term ‘legal black hole’ was used to describe the US detention regime at 
Guantanamo Bay: Johan Steyn, "Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole" (2004) 53 ICLQ 1. 
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executive action but not enough to constrain it in any meaningful way.68 In other words, legal 
black and grey holes emerge when the formal conception collides with the exercise of 
administrative discretion. As we will see, these concepts of legal black holes and grey holes 
allow us to fully flesh out the nature of the problem of discretion that is the core concern of the 
environmental reform position. 
A. The Challenge of Emergencies 
As we have seen, Schmitt’s basic argument is that emergencies cannot be governed by law. 
Schmitt argues that since the exception is unknowable in advance, the best that can be done is 
indicate who can make the decisions that must be made to contend with the exception. He claims 
it is the sovereign, or executive, who has the authority to decide “whether there is an extreme 
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it,”69 and thus the exception is what reveals 
who in fact the sovereign is.70 Any attempt to prescribe how the sovereign must respond to the 
exception is undermined by the fact that the exception cannot be predicted in advance, and 
therefore may require the violation of pre-existing rules. The sovereign, then, is unconstrained 
both in declaring the exception and determining what to do about it.71  
 
But Schmitt’s account of the emergency presupposes a specific understanding of law: he 
equates law with general legislative rules enacted in advance of the emergency. On Schmitt’s 
understanding of law, the legislature is the only legitimate source of legal norms, and since 
emergencies cannot be anticipated, they cannot be governed by pre-existing legal rules. I follow 
                                                            
68 Constitution, supra note 22 at 3. 
69 Schmitt, supra note 17 at 5. 
70 Ibid at 6, 13. 
71 Ibid at 6-7. The need for unfettered authority — including the decision to suspend the legal order altogether — 
cannot be ruled out, according to Schmitt, because it may be needed to defend against an existential threat. Schmitt 
argues that the exception reveals that the state cannot be completely circumscribed by law, since responding to the 
exception hinges on the discretionary decision-making power of the sovereign. 
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Dyzenhaus and others72 by calling this the ‘formal conception of the rule of law’ because it 
emphasizes the requirement of a formal allocation of distinct powers between institutions of 
government.  
 
For those that adhere to a formal conception of the rule of law, there are only two responses 
to the emergency. The first is to follow Schmitt in declaring that emergencies cannot be 
governed by law and advocating an extralegal response to the emergency that empowers public 
officials to take whatever actions they see fit to respond to a crisis.73 By and large, however, an 
extralegal approach is seen as incompatible with modern liberal-democratic principles.74 
Dyzenhaus calls this the “compulsion of legality”: the reality that public officials are not wont to 
act in open contravention of the law, but will rather seek to legitimize their acts by claiming they 
have legal authority.75 
 
The second possible response to the emergency, that follows from the formal conception, is 
to attempt to “accommodate” emergencies within legal order.76 Accommodation can take many 
forms, but it seeks to strike a compromise by imposing some rule-of-law requirements but still 
                                                            
72 David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, "Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. Canada" (2001) 
51 UTLJ 193 at 197-205 [‘Rethinking’]; Martin Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A study of the crisis in 
administrative law theory" (1978) UTLJ 215 [Loughlin]; Geneveive Cartier, "Procedural Fairness in Legislative 
Functions: The End of Judicial Abstinence?" (2003) 53 UTLJ 217 [Cartier]. 
73 For example, Mark Tushnet, "Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism" M Tushnet eds, The Constitution in 
Wartime (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2005) 39, and Terror, supra note 16. In Chaos, supra note 14, 
Gross advances an extralegal approach but argues that it is grounded in a Lockean understanding of prerogative 
powers. 
74 On the move away from prerogative powers see Thomas Poole, “Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common 
Law” (2009) 7 Int’l J Const L 247 at 252-8. 
75 David Dyzenhaus, "Cycles of Legality in Emergency Times" (2007) 18 Public Law Review 165 at 167 [‘Cycles’].  
76 The classic example of this is Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern 
Democracies (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002); updated by Ackerman, supra note 16. See also: Oren 
Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis (New York: Cambridge Univ Press, 2006) Chapter 1; Eric A 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, "Accommodating Emergencies" (2003) Stanford Law Review 605; John Ferejohn & 
Pasquale Pasquino, "The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers" (2004) 2 Int'l J Const L 210. 
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allowing for the inevitable flexibility needed by the executive to respond to a crisis. For example, 
a statute may set out requirements for responding to an emergency, such as Canada’s 
Emergencies Act77 and Emergency Management Act.78 The problem is that, since the emergency 
is unforeseeable, the requirements contained in the pre-existing statute will be necessarily very 
broad and will unavoidably delegate expansive discretionary authority to the executive.79 The 
more extreme or unforeseeable the emergency, the more pre-existing laws need to be stretched in 
order to ground the emergency response in law.  
 
David Dyzenhaus helpfully characterizes the problem of accommodation in terms of legal 
black and grey holes. Legal black holes arise where the legislature attempts to create a space 
uncontrolled by law, for example, by delegating ostensibly unfettered discretion to the executive 
to act in response to a crisis. Canada’s now repealed War Measures Act,80 is a paradigmatic 
example of a legal black hole: a legislative blank cheque81 to the executive to do whatever it 
likes. Dyzenhaus argues that legal grey holes are even more problematic than legal black holes, 
however, because they give the appearance of legal constraint without actually meaningfully 
constraining executive action.82 They are legal black holes ‘in disguise.’83 When emergency 
response decisions are challenged in court, judges adhering to a formal conception of the rule of 
law, will validate these black and grey holes by holding that the executive acts with legal 
                                                            
77 Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp). 
78 Emergency Management Act, SC 2007, c 15. 
79 Moreover, as Schmitt would point out, even an emergencies statute may need to be suspended to respond to a 
truly extreme threat. It should also be noted that accommodation also comes in the form of judges relaxing ordinary 
rule-of-law requirements such as due process: See Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 
SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 at para 77 and Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 
SCR 350, where the court avoids the true nature of the detention scheme to find that it does not violate the right to 
detention: ‘Cycles’, supra note 75 at 174. 
80 RSC 1970 c. W-2. 
81 Constitution, supra note 22 at 50. 
82 Ibid. at 42. 
83 Ibid. at 3. 
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authority.84 But this effectively creates a ‘rule-of-law façade,’ where executive decisions are 
governed by law only in the thin sense that they formally comply with validly enacted 
legislation, even though their enabling legislation may not set out any substantive constraints on 
the exercise of discretion.    
 
The provincial response to the mountain pine beetle epidemic created numerous potential 
legal black and grey holes. For example, the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) 
promulgated an emergency Bark Beetle Regulation,85 which enabled targeted harvesting efforts 
and relaxed ordinary administrative requirements. The Bark Beetle Regulation delegated 
unfettered discretionary authority permitting the Minister to identify emergency management 
areas for mountain pine beetle treatment ‘if satisfied’ that a forest was attacked or under danger 
of attack.86 In addition, it was itself authorized by a statutory provision that delegated open-
ended discretion to the executive to issue regulations “respecting the protection of forest 
resources.”87 The Minister of Forests also exercised discretion to determine the “policies and 
practices”88 to apply the minimum royalty to beetle-killed timber. Finally, the Chief Forester 
dramatically increased the allowable annual cut which raised the total amount of timber that 
companies could harvest in heavily-affected regions to facilitate the epidemic response.89 Each 
                                                            
84 For a particularly clear example of this see Hamdi et al v Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et al, 542 US 507 (2004) 
where the US Supreme Court finds that the use of military tribunals for American enemy combatants was authorized 
by the very generic Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 
85 Bark Beetle Regulation BC Reg 286/2001 [Beetle Regulation]. 
86 Beetle Regulation, supra note 85 at 2. 
87 Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act, RSBC 1996, c. 159, s. 211.1 (REPEALED: SBC 2003-55-103). 
88 Forest Act, RSBC 1996, c 157 s103 [Forest Act]. 
89 Nelson, supra note 37 at 465. While the Chief Forester must ‘consider’ a list of statutorily-prescribed factors in 
reaching this decision, he has considerable policymaking discretion over how to account for these factors in his 
ultimate decision. Forest Act, supra note 88 s8(8); Benjamin Cashore, "Fine-Tuning the Settings: The Timber 
Supply Review" In Search of Sustainability: British Columbia Forest Policy in the 1990s (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2000) 140 at 142. 
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response was a highly controversial, discretionary decision taken at the administrative — not the 
legislative — level. 
 
Note that the prevalence of discretion in the mountain pine beetle example is precisely the 
concern of the environmental reform position, a concern that we can now situate within the 
formal conception of the rule of law. Since the epidemic was unforeseen and the understanding 
of its dynamics changed rapidly over the course of each season, discretion was essential to 
respond quickly to the epidemic. The response was difficult to specify in advance and therefore 
could not occur exclusively through ex ante legislative rules.90 Moreover, all three decisions 
resulted from the exercise of everyday administrative discretion — regulation-making,91 
individual exemptions from ordinary forestry requirements, and discretionary decisions on 
stumpage fees and total harvest — all forms of discretion that the environmental reform position 
understands as threatening to the rule of law. The legislature deliberately delegated this authority 
to make significant policy decisions about British Columbia’s forests, and indeed, it is difficult to 
see how it could be otherwise. All of the decisions require sophisticated knowledge of the forest 
industry, and continual updating across all regions of the province in response to changing 
environmental, economic and social conditions.  
 
In other words, the possibility of legal black and grey holes extends beyond the immediate 
aftermath of an emergency, since they emerge whenever the formal conception of the rule of law 
intersects with the exercise of discretion. The emergency is one striking example of the exercise 
                                                            
90 Even alternative proposals would have proceeded through the same discretionary regulatory mechanisms (see, 
generally, Battling, supra note 33). 
91 The Beetle Regulation was an emergency regulation but did not differ substantively from ordinary environmental 
regulation in which discretionary authority to make orders or exemptions is utterly commonplace: Boyd, supra note 
54 at 140, 142. 
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of discretion, but discretion exists in non-exceptional cases as well. Dyzenhaus observes that 
every discretionary decision, for Schmitt, must be a “mini state of emergency or exception”92 
because the “official…has to make a quasi-sovereign or legislative decision, one that is 
ultimately unconstrained by legal norms.”93 What remains to be seen is whether these kinds of 
discretionary environmental decisions are in fact subject to a formal conception of the rule of 
law, which we now know from the environmental emergency, would result in the creation of 
legal black and grey holes that leave discretion effectively unconstrained by the rule of law. 
B. Black & Grey Holes in Environmental Law 
We shall now see that the environmental emergency validates the concerns of the 
environmental reform position: the formal conception persists in Canadian environmental law 
and results in the creation of legal black and grey holes that do not meaningfully constrain the 
exercise of discretion in the environmental context.94 As I will explain, the formal conception 
results in the creation of legal black holes where judges find environmental decisions not 
justiciable, only subject to review for vires, and not subject to common law requirements of 
procedural fairness. It results in the creation of legal grey holes where judges review 
environmental decisions but fail to give any ‘rule-of-law teeth’ to substantive statutory 
constraints where they do exist. First, however, it is necessary to say a bit more about how legal 
black holes and grey holes come to be in administrative law.  
 
                                                            
92 Constitution, supra note 22 at 60. 
93 Ibid. 
94 I have previously discussed a particularly strong assertion of the formal conception of the rule of law in Jocelyn 
Stacey, “The Rule-of-Law Underpinnings of Endangered Species Protection: Minister of Fisheries and Oceans v 
David Suzuki Foundation, 2012 FCA 40” (2014) 27 JELP 57 and argued that, even though this decision yielded a 
positive environmental result, it unnecessarily created a legal black hole in another area of environmental regulation. 
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The influence of the formal conception on Canadian administrative law can be traced to 
Dicey’s conception of the rule of law, which distinguishes between the dual roles of the 
legislature and the judiciary.95 On the one hand, he argues, the legislature possesses a monopoly 
over lawmaking and, on the other, the judiciary a monopoly over law interpretation.96 The 
modern administrative state presents a fundamental problem for this conception of the rule of 
law. Where the legislature deliberately delegates discretionary authority to administrative 
decision-makers Diceyan — or formalist— judges attempt to preserve the formal conception of 
the rule of law in the face of conflicting legislative intentions. On the one hand, the legislature 
signals that it is the administrative decision-maker, not the court, that has final decision-making 
authority; but, on the other, the logical inference is that legislature intends some limits on the 
statutorily-created decision-maker’s power.  
 
The formalist judge attempts to reconcile this tension by according the administrative 
decision-maker “free rein within certain legal limits,”97 which means that judges will strictly 
enforce the statutory language and common law requirements of procedural fairness, but will 
give decision-makers free rein over the substance of their decisions. In other words, formalist 
judges are content to create legal black holes whereby issues that fall within the administrator’s 
statutory jurisdiction are only governed by the rule of law insofar as they are authorized by 
validly enacted legislation. And they will be content to create legal grey holes where the 
statutory language imposes minimal constraints on decision-makers that do not effectively 
constrain the exercise of discretion.  
                                                            
95 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed, 1959) [Dicey]. Dicey’s conception 
has been ‘remarkably influential’ on Canadian administrative law: National Corn Growers Assn v Canada (Import 
Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1332, per Wilson J 
96 ‘Rethinking’, supra note 72 at 198. 
97 ‘Rethinking’, supra note 72 at 204. 
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i. Legal Black Holes: Environmental Regulations 
As we saw in the mountain pine beetle context, the legislature delegates significant 
discretionary authority to the executive to issue regulations. Much of the detail and difficult 
trade-offs required by environmental statutes are left to regulations. This means that the 
executive has discretion both over whether to issue regulations, and the substance of those 
regulations. The environmental emergency reveals that regulations issued by the executive exist 
in a legal black hole: the failure to issue regulations is not justiciable, and regulations are subject 
only to vires review and are not subject to the requirements of procedural fairness. 
 
On the failure to issue regulations, the law is very clear: the matter is not justiciable; that is, 
not subject to judicial review.98 Regulations have the force of law; they are a form of legislation 
— delegated legislation — and thus an extension of Parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament is 
omnicompetent and can choose to legislate (or not) over any matter. Courts have applied the 
same logic to delegated legislation to conclude that they cannot require the executive to issue 
regulations where no action has been taken.99 But regulations cannot, in principle, be entirely 
off-limits for formalist judges. Regulations, just like any other delegated authority, are bound by 
their statutory scheme and the formalist judge must patrol those statutory boundaries. Formalist 
judges, then, feel a great deal of strain when faced with challenges to the legality of regulations.  
 
The Federal Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth100 brings this formalist tension to the 
surface. The issue arose from the executive’s intransigence regarding the Kyoto Protocol 
Implementation Act. The legislation, passed by the opposition parties against the minority 
                                                            
98 For example, Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada 2008 FCA 229, [2009] 3 FCR 136 at para 53; John M 
Keyes, Executive Legislation 2d ed, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) at 529. 
99 Ibid. 
100 2008 FC 1183, [2009] 3 FCR 201 [FOTE]. 
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government, set out ostensibly binding requirements, including a requirement to issue 
regulations to mitigate climate change by a specific deadline, which the executive failed to do.101 
The administrative decision – to not issue regulations by a statutory deadline – fell squarely 
within the traditional lawmaking monopoly, which requires judicial abstinence from the 
formalist’s perspective. But the refusal to act also directly undermined the objective of the 
legislation and the specific language of the authorizing provisions. The only way the Federal 
Court could make sense of this tension was to conclude that the provisions “reflect only a 
permissive intent,”102 that the legislature did not intend to create legally enforceable duties.103 
This interpretation allowed the Federal Court to keep the formal conception intact. The Court 
created a legal black hole by patrolling the boundaries of the legislation, but simply concluded 
that there were none that could be legally enforced.104 
 
In addition the executive typically has broad discretion over the substance of the regulations. 
The environmental reform position highlights the concern that the substance of the regulations 
can easily undermine the environmental protection goals articulated by the legislature. Judicial 
review of regulations in Canada again seems to validate this concern. Regulations are subject to 
judicial review only for their vires; that is, on the narrow question of whether they fall within the 
scope of their statutory authority.105 Vires review is a direct product of the formal conception, 
where the judicial role is to police the boundaries and the substance of the regulations — their 
wisdom, or their ability to achieve the legislative objective — are entirely off-limits to the courts. 
                                                            
101 Ibid. s 7-9. 
102 FOTE, supra note 100 at para 37. 
103 Ibid. at para 35. 
104 Ibid. at para 46 the Court states: “the Court has no role to play reviewing the reasonableness of the government’s 
response to Canada’s Kyoto commitments within the four corners of the [Act].” 
105 The Supreme Court most recently affirmed this in Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Health and Long- Term 
Care), 2013 SCC 64, [2013] 3 SCR 810.  
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Only if the regulation is “irrelevant,” “extraneous,” or “completely unrelated to the statutory 
purpose” will the court find that the regulation is invalid.106 This means that it is extremely 
difficult to challenge regulations that undermine environmental protection goals contained in 
their enabling legislation. Both the purpose of environmental legislation and the specific 
provisions enabling regulation-making are often cast in extremely broad terms meaning that it 
would take an outrageous regulation to exceed these statutory limits.107  
 
Moreover, environmental regulations are not subject to the duty of procedural fairness. The 
doctrine of procedural fairness has consistently required judges to formally classify decisions to 
determine whether the duty of fairness applies.108 While the courts have expanded the duty of 
fairness from decisions categorized as ‘judicial’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ to most administrative 
decisions, they have retained a category of ‘legislative’ decisions, which are not subject to 
common law procedural requirements.109 The legislative distinction is a remnant of the formal 
conception, under which the integrity of the legislative process was maintained through judicial 
non-interference.110 Judges broadened the requirements of procedural fairness to all adjudicatory 
administrative decisions out of concern for the preservation of the integrity of the judicial 
process. But they had no such role for decisions of a legislative nature.111 Since environmental 
decisions are often complex, “political”112 matters which courts implicitly understand as part of 
                                                            
106 Ibid. at para 28. 
107 See, for example, Sandy Pond Alliance to Protect Canadian Waters Inc v Canada, 2013 FC 1112 where the 
Federal Court upheld a regulation that permitted the conversion of a lake into a tailings pond for untreated mining 
effluent on the basis that the Fisheries Act was for the “general management” of the fisheries.  
108 Grant Huscroft, "From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content, and the Role of Judicial Review" C 
Flood & L Sossin eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2d (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2012) 
147 at 148-9. 
109 Ibid. at 156-7. 
110 Cartier, supra note 72 at 237. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Imperial Oil v Quebec, [2003] 2 SCR 264 at para 38. (See also Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1435 at para 113.) 
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the traditional lawmaking monopoly, they are not typically subject to the duty of procedural 
fairness. 
  
The formal conception singles out the ‘lawmaking’ character or appearance of the 
administrative decision. Regulations fall squarely within the ‘lawmaking’ category because they 
are functionally identical to legislation and are thus understood to be outside the proper sphere of 
the courts. But this overstates important distinctions between the two. Unlike the legislature, the 
executive has no inherent authority to make law. This means that regulations always exist within 
a legal framework. And while regulations are typically issued by elected decision-makers — a 
Minister or Cabinet — it is incorrect to assume, as the formal conception seems to, that this is a 
sufficient condition for democratic legitimacy. Legislation is democratic, not only because it is 
enacted by elected officials, but also because it is the product of deliberation and open debate by 
opposing parties.113 While formal regulations are subject to some uniform requirements, such as 
publication,114 procedural requirements for regulations are patchy.115 Moreover, the formal 
conception ignores the fact that the legislature has deliberately relinquished its monopoly over 
lawmaking by delegating general policymaking authority to the executive.116 Indeed, the simple 
fact that the legislature has authorized the exercise of discretion is true of all administrative 
action and is not sufficient to immunize an administrative decision from judicial oversight in any 
other context. 
 
                                                            
113 Cartier, supra note 72 at 242-3. 
114 Statutory Instruments Act, RSC 1985, c S-22 (notably, the s 5 requirement of publication). 
115 Andrew Green, "Regulations and Rule Making: The Dilemma of Delegation" C Flood, L Sossin eds, 
Administrative Law in Context 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd, 2013) 125 at 142. 
116 Cartier, supra note 72 at 238. 
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The persistence of the formal conception in the case of regulations presents another problem. 
Because the formal conception is a product of a practical compromise, there is no principled 
basis on which to distinguish the kinds of ‘lawmaking’ that attract vires review and those that are 
subject to substantive review, or those that attract the duty of procedural fairness and ‘legislative’ 
decisions that do not. While formal regulations may be easy enough to delineate, courts, relying 
on the formal conception, have concluded that environmental policies are ‘legislative’ and not 
the proper subject of review.117 Even in instances where the executive is delegated authority to 
make an individual decision, judges have relied on the formal conception to give the decision-
maker effectively free rein.118 Moreover, the formal conception ignores the fact that 
environmental decision-makers are often delegated the choice of regulatory instrument;119 that is, 
a decision can be taken by way of regulation, informal policy, or ad hoc individual decisions. All 
options have the same effect on the environment and authorized individual, but are potentially 
subject to different rule-of-law requirements based on their classification. In short, there is no 
clear dimension along which the courts can determine which issues are sufficiently ‘political’ or 
‘legislative’ in nature that they ought to be exempt from substantive judicial review. 120 When 
faced with complex policy matters, the court can revert to vires review, even where the decision 
lacks the insignia of actual lawmaking.  
 
                                                            
117 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1984] 3 WWR 270, BCK No 1472 (QL) at 
para 24 (review of the stumpage policy). Moreover, the Court’s characterization of what counts as ‘legislative’ 
seems to have shifted: compare CNR v Canada, 2014 SCC 40 at para 51 to Attorney General (Canada) v. Inuit 
Tapirisat et al., [1980] 2 SCR 735 at 754. 
118 Carpenter Fishing Corp. v Canada, [1998] 2 F.C. 548, 155 D.L.R. (4th) 572 at para 37, reaffirmed in Association 
des crevettiers acadiens du Golfe inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 305.  
119 For example, the Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14 s 35(2). 
120 Cartier, supra note 72 at 233.  
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ii. Legal Grey Holes: Ineffective Substantive Constraints on Environmental Decisions  
In addition to these black holes, the formal conception also leads judges to create legal grey 
holes in cases where the legislature has imposed some, albeit minimal, substantive constraints on 
environmental decisions. For example, the emergency mountain pine beetle regulation 
authorized the Minister to make a designation ‘if satisfied’ that an area was attacked or in danger 
of being attacked. This language reflects the complex context in which the decision-maker is 
expected to operate: certain relevant factors may be identified in advance, but what these factors 
look like in any given situation will vary, as will how the decision-maker might account for 
them. Delegating decision-making authority in subjective terms — “if satisfied that” or “of the 
opinion that” — is common in environmental law. Although the legislature has, in these 
circumstances, attempted to set out some substantive criteria for guiding a difficult and 
inevitably discretionary decision, courts are frequently unwilling to give these criteria any rule-
of-law teeth.  
 
A striking creation of a legal grey hole arose again in the British Columbia forestry context. 
In David Suzuki Foundation v. British Columbia (Attorney General),121 the David Suzuki 
Foundation challenged the Lieutenant Governor in Council’s decision to issue an exemption to a 
prohibition of the export of timber from British Columbia’s northwest. Under the Forest Act, the 
LGIC could grant an exemption “if satisfied” that, amongst other conditions, the timber was in 
surplus.122 The Foundation argued that the surplus condition was not met and therefore the 
exemption was ultra vires the Act. The British Columbia Supreme Court disagreed. It found that 
the provision conferred an “exclusive,”123 “complete, unfettered, subjective discretion”124 on the 
                                                            
121 2004 BCSC 620 [Suzuki]. 
122 Forest Act, supra note 88 s 128(1). 
123 Suzuki, supra note 121 at para 11. 
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LGIC to issue an exemption. The Act only required that the LGIC ‘be satisfied’ that the 
conditions were met, and since the order itself stated that the LCIG was satisfied as to the 
existence of the conditions, the court was not entitled to look beyond the order to assess whether 
the objective evidence supported the decision. The court was content with the fact there was 
“some evidence” supporting the decision and found that “the conditions which may have 
motivated the LGIC…are irrelevant.”125 The court understood its role in “a basic jurisdictional” 
sense, meaning that the court’s role was to patrol the boundaries of the legislation and not second 
guess decisions taken within those bounds.126  
 
Even where the court purports to conduct substantive review to determine whether a decision 
is reasonable it can still create a legal grey hole.127 In Sierra Club v Ontario (Ministry of Natural 
Resources),128 the Sierra Club challenged the Minister’s decision to permit the disturbance of 
endangered species habitat for the construction of a new bridge across the Detroit River. The 
legislation set out the Minister’s authority in purely subjective terms, requiring that the Minister 
consult with “a person who is considered by the Minister to be an expert ….and to be 
independent of the person who would be authorized by the permit to engage in the activity.”129 
At issue was the fact that one expert report, on which the Minister relied and which contradicted 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
124 Ibid. at para 12. 
125 Ibid. para 145. 
126 Ibid. para 91. 
127 Whether any given application of reasonableness review is underpinned by a formal conception or not is an open 
question, since the application of reasonableness is far from consistent: e.g. Matthew Lewans, "Deference and 
Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir" (2012) 38 Queen's L J 59, Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness 
Review” (2015) 52 Alta L Rev forthcoming. For another controversial environmental example of how the formal 
conception persists even under the guise of substantive review, see Forest Ethics Advocacy Association and Sinclair 
v National Energy Board, 2014 FCA 245 where the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the National Energy Board’s 
restrictive interpretation of its mandate (to exclude upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions) largely on 
the grounds that the statutory language does not explicitly require consideration of such large scale effects.   
128 2011 ONSC 4655 [Sierra]. 
129 Endangered Species Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 6 s 17(2). 
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a second expert, was produced by an employee of the company bidding for the project.130 While 
the Court expressed reservations about the appearance of independence “that the Minister might 
have been better to avoid,”131 the Court nonetheless found that the Minister complied with the 
Act. It did so in purely formal terms. Since the expert provided the Minister with a statement that 
declared his independence, the Court found that “[s]trictly speaking, it confirm[ed] the 
independence of the expert”132 and all that the legislation required was “that the Minister consult 
and obtain a written report.”133 In other words, the Court created a legal grey hole in which a 
legislative requirement to consult with independent experts before deciding whether an activity 
will jeopardize the survival or recovery of an endangered species is no more than a formal 
reporting exercise that does not receive meaningful scrutiny on review.  
 
Indeed, it seems that only in egregious cases where the decision completely lacks an 
evidentiary basis will the court intervene.134 So long as there is evidence that the decision-maker 
turned her mind to the relevant statutory factors — ticked the appropriate boxes — the court will 
not question the basis for the decision-maker’s subjective judgment.135 Without some 
examination of the decision-maker’s reasons for a decision, however, virtually any outcome is 
permissible, since, as we have seen, environmental legislation is cast in the broadest of terms. 
Indeed, allegations that a decision-maker has been driven by an improper purpose, such as 
                                                            
130 Ibid. at para 64. 
131 Ibid. at para 68. 
132 Ibid. at para 65. 
133 Ibid. at paras 72, 90. 
134 Alberta Wilderness Association v Minister of Environment, 2009 FC 710; Environmental Defence Canada v 
Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans, 2009 FC 878. 
135 Sierra, supra note 128 at para 77; See also: Western Canada Wilderness Committee v. British Columbia (Forests, 
Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2014 BCSC 808; David Suzuki Foundation v. British Columbia (Ministry 
of Environment), 2013 BCSC 874; Pacific Booker Minerals Inc. v. British Columbia (Environment), 2013 BCSC 
2258; Castle-Crown Wilderness Coalition v. Alberta (Director of Regulatory Assurance Division, Alberta 
Environment), 2005 ABCA 283 (all involving qualified discretion).  
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political lobbying136 or, as we have seen, a potential stake in the outcome, are often skimmed 
over on the way to the court’s conclusion that the outcome falls easily within the broad 
perimeters of the legislation.137   
 
The court’s justification for focusing on the outcome, rather than the record or reasons for the 
decision, is logical from the perspective of the formal conception of the rule of law. 
Discretionary environmental decisions involve complex scientific issues and policy-laden 
considerations, which are typically accompanied by a clear legislative signal that the decision-
maker ought to have wide room for manoeuvre. For the court to scrutinize the substance of these 
decisions would pull judges far away from their traditional monopoly of law-interpretation. The 
court is not “an academy of science to arbitrate conflicting scientific predictions.”138 Nor is it in 
the business of lawmaking, in the sense of making policy determinations about the 
appropriateness of fishing licenses, project approvals, or endangered species protection. 
 
The influence of the formal conception of the rule of law, even in cases of individual 
environmental decisions, supports the environmental reform position’s concern that judges are 
not imposing effective constraints on the exercise of discretion. To give meaning to substantive 
statutory criteria would require them to review matters that fall well outside their traditional 
monopoly. They thus resort to the creation of legal grey holes which permit decision-makers to 
                                                            
136 Malcolm v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2014 FCA 130 at para 57. 
137 Review is often further hampered by court’s unwillingness to require decision-makers to give reasons: Lorne 
Sossin, "The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli v. Duplessis: Justiciability, Discretion, and the Limits of the Rule of 
Law" (2010) 55 McGill LJ 661 at 684. Indeed, recent developments at the Supreme Court of Canada seem to 
continually weaken the requirement to offer reasons. See, in particular, McLean v. British Columbia (Securities 
Commission), 2013 SCC 67 where the Court accepts ex post rationalizations of the administrative decision.  
138 Vancouver Island Peace Society v Canada, 1992 3 FCR 42 at para 12. 
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claim that are acting in accordance with the rule of law without being subject to meaningful 
judicial oversight. 
IV. Responding to the Environmental Emergency 
The argument so far has been that the environmental emergency reveals both the necessity 
and desirability of discretion, but that the formal conception of the rule of law is incapable of 
providing meaningful constraints on the exercise of that discretion. In other words, the 
environmental reform position is right to call our attention to the pervasive problem of discretion 
in Canadian environmental law, since the courts seem beholden to the formal conception which 
leads judges to create legal black and grey holes. Yet, the environmental reform position does 
not seem to face up to the emergency features inherent in environmental issues. As we will now 
see, reformers offer up two possible reforms both of which follow from a formal conception of 
the rule of law and thus cannot deliver the rule-of-law constraints that the environmental reform 
position seeks. The article then concludes by introducing a competing conception of the rule of 
law, one that requires an ongoing commitment to public justification, and points to the necessity 
of creative institutional design in environmental law. 
A. Environmental Reform Solutions 
This section focuses on two common solutions that follow from the environmental reform 
position: stricter legislative rules and delegation to independent decision-makers. To be sure, 
environmental reformers may disagree on the respective strengths and weaknesses of these 
potential solutions and offer more detailed reform proposals for specific environmental issues. 
But much of Canadian environmental law scholarship has focused on the potential for either 
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legislative reform to create rules or independent decision-making to strengthen Canadian 
environmental law.   
 
For example, Boyd instructs that “[d]iscretionary language in environmental laws and 
regulations should be replaced by mandatory language; three decades of experience have proven 
time and again that politicians and bureaucrats will exercise their discretion to the environment’s 
detriment.”139 Similarly, Pardy advocates crafting an ‘environmental rule,’ which would prohibit 
non-natural, permanent damage to ecosystems.140 But for reasons already discussed, both 
proposals would not solve the ‘problem’ of discretion. To recapitulate, it is not possible to 
eliminate ‘discretionary language’ because it is often impossible to know in advance what 
actions should be taken to achieve environmental protection objectives. This is the key insight 
that follows from viewing the environment as an ongoing emergency.  
 
Pardy’s proposal, while considerably more elegant than the current tangle of prohibitions, 
qualifiers and exemptions found in Canadian environmental law, simply embeds discretionary 
judgment calls within its open-textured language.141 What constitutes ‘non-natural,’ or 
‘permanent,’ or even an ‘ecosystem’ is a highly contextual and often contentious determination. 
Under a general environmental rule, discretion would not be eliminated nor minimized, merely 
shuffled around. Schmitt’s challenge cannot be met by simply making fewer, simpler or better ex 
ante rules. But to see that this solution is inadequate, environmental law has to own up its 
unavoidable subjection to Schmitt’s challenge in the first place.  
                                                            
139 Boyd, supra note 54 at 293. 
140 Bruce Pardy, "In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem" (2005) 1 McGill 
Int'l J Sust Dev L & Pol'y 29. 
141 See also Ruhl, supra 43. 
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A similar problem arises from the second solution that follows from the environmental 
reform position: delegating environmental decision-making authority to independent experts 
rather than elected members of the executive. Independent expert tribunals appeal to the 
environmental reform position because they promise to remove politics from environmental 
decision-making. For example, the 2012 amendments to the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, which transferred final decision-making authority from the National Energy 
Board to the federal Cabinet, prompted an outcry representative of the reform position. The 
problem, one commentator observes, is that Cabinet lacks the “objectivity and expertise” of the 
Board; “[s]hifting the decision for major energy projects from the Board to Cabinet will 
politicize what was an otherwise independent regulatory process.”142 But as we will see, the 
Board, just like Cabinet, necessarily exercises significant policymaking discretion which cannot 
be eliminated through objective expertise. Simply put, delegating environmental decision-
making authority to an independent expert, without more, does not respond to the environmental 
reform position’s concern about discretion. 
 
Independent expert decision-makers play a significant role in environmental decision-
making. As we have already seen, British Columbia’s Chief Forester implemented one of the 
province’s key responses to the mountain pine beetle epidemic by exercising his discretion to 
increase the allowable harvest in areas affected by the epidemic. The Chief Forester exercises 
considerable discretion in determining the allowable annual cut for all regions of the province, 
and,“[o]f all the decisions facing forest policymakers, [it is] probably the most critical in terms of 
                                                            
142 Legal Backgrounder: The National Energy Board Act 1985 (Toronto: Ecojustice, 2012) online: 
<http://www.ecojustice.ca/files/neba-backgrounder-may-2012/at_download/file>. 
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its economic importance.”143 But to reconcile the Chief Forester’s broad discretion with the 
formal conception of the rule of law, we must assume that objective expertise can provide the 
constraints on discretion that the legislature is unable to provide.144 From this perspective, 
objective expertise means that the decision-maker is not exercising discretion in any real sense. 
Rather, an independent decision-maker is simply doing what the legislature, or indeed anyone, 
would do if they possessed the requisite knowledge.145  
 
As we will see these assumptions are unsound, but they have a strong footing in the history 
of Canadian environmental law. Indeed, the office of the Chief Forester was originally conceived 
in just these terms. The Chief Forester was “a first-class, scientific man, thoroughly well 
qualified, who has had both technical and practical training and experience.”146 The legislature 
delegated a task that it could not do itself: the Chief Forester was to consolidate and synthesize 
the vast information on the province’s forests in order to act “in all matters affecting the forest 
interests in the Province.”147 The Chief Forester applied this expertise to determine the rate of 
harvesting that would maximize long-term timber yield through a technical process known as 
Hanzlik’s formula.148 The determination appeared to turn on purely factual questions – the rate 
                                                            
143 Peter Pearse, Timber Rights and Forest Policy In British Columbia - Volume I (Victoria: Government of British 
Columbia,1976) [Pearse] at 219.  
144 James M Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) at 25-6. See also: John 
Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional" (1935) 1 UTLJ 
53 at 75-81 (Willis’s functionalist approach emphasizes expediency and the role of expertise, though he does not 
deny the necessity of administrative discretion). 
145 Richard B. Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law" (1975) Harv L Rev 1667at 1678; Mark 
Seidenfeld, "The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State" (2013) 1397 at 1404. 
146 Fred J Fulton, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Timber and Forestry 1909-1910 (Victoria: Government of British 
Columbia, 1910) at 60 at 67. 
147 Ibid. at 68. 
148 Larry Pedersen, “Allowable Annual Cuts in British Columbia: The Agony and the Ecstasy” (UBC Faculty of 
Forestry Jubilee Lecture) delivered at the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia 20 March 2003) at 4 
online: British Columbia Ministry of Forestry <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/pubs/jubilee_ubc.pdf> [Pedersen]. 
Hanzlik’s formula is Sustained annual yield = mature timber above rotation age/rotation age + mean annual 
increment for immature timber. 
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of forest growth, the amount of forest mature enough to harvest, areas accessible to loggers for 
harvesting.149 The decision-making authority of the Chief Forester, therefore, appeared 
consistent with the formal conception of the rule of law because the Chief Forester retained a 
purely instrumental and technical role in using objective expertise to carry out the democratic 
mandate of the legislature. 
 
The assumption that the independent expert applies solely objective expertise contains two 
further assumptions. It first assumes that independent decision-makers deal only with factual 
matters150 — not political or policy judgments — and, second, that these factual matters can be 
resolved in a way that points to one objective outcome. The latter assumption is flatly refuted by 
the environmental emergency, as we have seen with the mountain pine beetle example. And, 
moreover, there is no objective way to deal with this kind of uncertainty151 because complex, 
adaptive systems are replete with poorly understood relationships and incomplete data, often 
making it more an exercise of “speculation”152 than objective analysis. Moreover, even 
seemingly factual issues, such as determining the rotation age for harvesting, in fact turn on 
further assumptions about the future.153 In short, accurate forestry inventories are necessary but 
not sufficient to determine the desired rate of timber harvest, since the Chief Forester will have 
to make discretionary judgments on a whole host of uncertain factors.  
                                                            
149 Lois H Dellert, "Sustained Yield: Why Has it Failed to Achieve Sustainability?" in Chris Tollefson eds, The 
Wealth of Forests (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998) 255 at 257. 
150 Henry S Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 115. 
151 This is the main thesis of Regulating, supra note 47. 
152 Pearse, supra note 143 at 232. 
153 In a Royal Commission on the regulation of timber harvest, three experts disagreed on the rotation age, with 
proposals ranging from 60 to 120 years. (Gordon Sloan, The Forest Resources of British Columbia (Victoria: 
Government of British Columbia, 1956) at 236, 241.) Moreover, a recent groundbreaking scientific study challenges 
the long held assumption that aging trees have slower growth rates: NL Stephenson et al, “Rate of tree carbon 
accumulation increases continuously with tree size” (2014) 507 Nature 90. 
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The assumption that independent experts deal only with factual matters, and not political 
judgments, is also undermined by the Chief Forester’s prominent position in directing British 
Columbian forest policy. In this respect, the Chief Forester’s determination of the allowable 
annual cut is significant for what it does not include. Even now, long after Hanzlik’s formula has 
faded into the background, the allowable annual cut is still dictated by a policy of maximizing 
sustained yield. Maximum sustainable yield includes the value of timber; it does not account for 
the myriad other benefits that forests provide — e.g. hunting, grazing, water quality regulation, 
biodiversity, and carbon sequestration. Calls to incorporate these non-timber values into the 
maximum sustained yield model have gone largely unfilled,154 evidence of the difficulty of 
incorporating what are inherently discretionary decisions involving incommensurable trade-offs 
into a technical model of decision-making premised on an assumption of objective expertise.  
 
In short, delegating environmental decisions to independent experts does not resolve the 
challenge that environmental issues pose to governing through law. Independent expert decision-
makers exercise considerable discretion which cannot be fully constrained by objective expertise. 
Moreover, an assumption of objective expertise risks creating a similar kind of façade that 
Schmitt argues exists in the emergency context. Layers of technical analysis that appear to 
constrain the decision-maker on the substantive outcome in fact require the exercise of 
significant discretion over what inputs to include in the technocratic calculation.155 Indeed, the 
Chief Forester’s approach to determining the annual harvest was criticized on this very basis, 
                                                            
154 Dellert, supra note 149. There has always been unwavering faith that better modelling techniques and more data 
will respond to criticism: Pearse, supra note 143 at 233 and AL Peel, The Future of Our Forests (Victoria: Forest 
Resources Commission, 1991) 1991 at 75. 
155 Regulating, supra note 47 at 72.  
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with forest commentators observing that “[r]egardless of which formula or model was used, from 
the 1950s to the 1990s, economic forces caused the annual harvest to increase, in spite of the 
original expectation of reductions in the harvest.”156 Far from constraining administrative 
discretion, in other words, technical forest analyses were in fact capacious frameworks in which 
decision-makers could covertly succumb to industry pressure. Independent expert decision-
makers alone cannot, therefore, provide an answer the environmental reform position’s problem 
with discretion. 
B. An Alternative Conception of the Rule of Law 
Understanding environmental issues as an ongoing emergency reveals the limits of the 
formal conception of the rule of law. It also directs us to an alternative understanding of the rule 
of law, one that accounts for the inevitability and the desirability of administrative discretion 
and, as we will see, has the potential to ensure that discretionary environmental decisions are 
subject to rule-of-law constraints. This section turns to the theory of common law 
constitutionalism, which understands “the constraints of law as the constraints of adequate 
justification”157 and requires that public officials justify their decisions on the basis of 
fundamental constitutional principles. As we will see, the requirement of public justification can 
be maintained in emergencies, and thus holds great potential for responding to the environmental 
emergency. Moreover, the environmental emergency contains important insights for common 
law constitutionalism because it highlights the need for significant institutional innovation across 
a broad range of administrative contexts to ensure that the requirement of public justification can 
be fulfilled. 
                                                            
156 GF Utzig & DL Macdonald, Citizens’ Guide to Allowable Annual Cut Determinations (Vancouver: BC 
Environmental Network Educational Foundation, 2000) at 6. 
157 Supra note 13. 
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i. The Requirement of Public Justification 
The observation that discretionary environmental decisions still seem to be governed by the 
formal conception of the rule of law is significant, not only for environmental protection, but 
also because Canadian judges have largely moved away from a formal conception of the rule of 
law. This transition, usually marked by the watershed Supreme Court decisions in CUPE158 and 
Nicholson159 in 1979 and continuing to this day, has been a product of the judiciary’s growing 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the administrative state. The strongest signal of this move is the 
Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of a concept of ‘deference as respect,’ which first 
appeared in Baker,160 where the majority effectively articulated a requirement of public 
justification.  
 
Baker concerned the Minister’s refusal to exempt from deportation a woman who had 
illegally overstayed in Canada. The legislation and regulations delegated seemingly unfettered 
discretion to the Minister to grant an exemption ‘if satisfied’ that one should be granted on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. For the majority, however, this language did not mean 
that the Minister operated in a space uncontrolled by law. Rather, the majority found, the 
Minister’s “discretion must be exercised with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the 
principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of 
Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.”161  
                                                            
158 C.U.P.E. v N.B. Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 227. 
159 Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311. 
160 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker], quoting David 
Dyzenhaus,“The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M Taggart ed, The Province of 
Administrative Law (1997) 279 at 286 
161 Ibid. at para 56. 
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But to determine whether discretion was exercised in this manner, the majority had to impose 
a requirement to give reasons,162 which allowed the court to meaningfully assess whether the 
decision was reasonable in the sense of reflecting these fundamental legal principles. Under this 
understanding of the rule of law, decision-makers were not owed deference simply because of 
their institutional expertise or because they complied with the formal requirements of their 
enabling statute. Rather, they were owed deference when their decisions were justified. In other 
words, deference “requires not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or 
which could be offered in support of a decision.”163 On this view, administrative discretion is not 
an illegitimate space uncontrolled by law, but is rather legitimate and worthy of judicial respect 
when exercised in a manner that reflects the fundamental legal principles alluded to in Baker. 
  
The majority’s reasons in Baker reflect a competing conception of the rule of law that 
imposes a requirement on public officials to publicly justify their decisions.164 From this 
perspective, the rule of law is not “the rule of rules,”165 as Schmitt would understand it, but is, 
rather first and foremost, the realization of constitutional principles. Administrative decisions 
have legal authority when they reflect these constitutional principles.166 Dyzenhaus argues that 
these constitutional principles are those that form the foundation of administrative law, 
exemplified in Baker — fairness, equality and reasonableness167 — which are necessary to 
                                                            
162 Ibid. at para 43. 
163 Ibid. at para 60, quoting Dyzenhaus, ‘Politics,’ supra note 160. 
164 ‘Justification,’ supra note 13 at 30. 
165 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 336. 
166 Constitution, supra note 22 at 7. 
167 Ibid. at 12-3; Evan J Criddle, "Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law" (2010) 104 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1271 at 1276 [Criddle]. 
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“protect the individual from arbitrary state action.”168 Reason-giving is essential to this 
conception of the rule of law, because it is through offering public reasons that decision-makers 
discharge their duty of justification.169 Reasons ensure that the individual knows that she or he 
has not been treated arbitrarily by the state, but they also ensure that the institutions of 
government can hold one another to account when they fall short in their commitment to the rule 
of law. Judicial review is one way to ensure that administrative decision-makers meet their 
requirement of public justification. But it also requires that judges defer — that is, not substitute 
their own views — when the decision is justified on the basis of fairness, equality, and 
reasonableness.170 
 
The Supreme Court’s commitment to the requirement of public justification has been 
imperfect, to be sure. As we have seen, the formal conception still emerges and often conflicts 
with the common law constitutional conception of the rule of law. Even in the immigration 
context, the court has retreated from the majority’s decision in Baker. In both Suresh,171 a post-
9/11 national security decision, and more recently Khosa,172 the Supreme Court stated that the 
court’s role was only to ensure that the Minister considered the correct factors, and that “the 
courts should not reweigh them.”173 In other words, the Court allowed the Minister free rein in 
how to account for these factors. So long as the Minister ticked the appropriate boxes, the Court 
                                                            
168 Constitution, supra note 51 at 2. See also TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 2001) at 38-9. 
169 Constitution, supra note 22 at 139. 
170 Ibid. at 147. 
171 Suresh, supra note 79. 
172 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 [Khosa]. 
173 Suresh, supra note 79 at para 41; see also Khosa, supra note 172 at para 61. 
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refused to second-guess the Minister’s exercise of discretion.174 Moreover, there was no hint in 
either decision of the non-statutory principles identified by the majority in Baker.175  
 
The Court’s decision important decision in Dunsmuir,176 an attempt to set straight the 
principles of administrative law, itself reflected conflicting conceptions of the rule of law.177 The 
majority reasserted its monopoly over some formal categories of decisions — constitutional 
questions178 and true questions of vires,179 for example. But it still urged courts to take a 
contextual approach to determining the appropriate standard of review,180 and reiterated that, in 
cases where deference was owed, the court’s role was to ensure “the existence of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.”181 However since 
Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court’s formalistic inclinations have again, in some respects, waned. 
The Court has since deferred to administrative decision-makers on issues that fall squarely 
within traditional judicial strongholds, including a constitutional question,182 the application of 
the common law doctrine of estoppel,183 and the breach of a statutory deadline, which would 
have conventionally been labelled a true question of vires.184 Indeed, the Court has suggested 
that the concept of a true question of vires, the very basis on which a formalist judge justifies 
                                                            
174 Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty's Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
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176 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]. 
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184 Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61 [Teachers’]. 
See also Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10 (where the 
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judicial review, may have been a fiction after all,185 thus sending the clear message that the Court 
has accepted the legitimacy of the administrative state. 
 
Moreover, the Court has recently restated its position in Baker, that there is no such thing as 
unfettered discretion. It is noteworthy that this clear statement occurred with respect to a 
municipal by-law — delegated legislation issued by a democratically elected decision-maker. 
Yet a unanimous Supreme Court found that this decision was subject to the supervision of the 
courts because “[t]he fact that wide deference is owed to municipal councils does not mean they 
have carte blanche.”186 Indeed, the Court observed that the “attempt to maintain a clear line 
between policy and legality has not prevailed.”187 The Court reasserted its supervisory role to 
ensure that, in passing delegated legislation, a municipality adheres to both procedural and 
substantive requirements of legality.188 
 
While there is much work to be done in developing what public justification would look like 
in environmental law, a “symbolic”189 Federal Court decision offers some hope that this 
conception of the rule of law is taking root in Canadian environmental assessment. In finding the 
environmental assessment of the proposed Darlington nuclear power project unreasonable, the 
Court in Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney General), reasoned that the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act sets out a process “that is, when it functions properly, both 
                                                            
185 Teachers’, supra note 184 at para 34. 
186 Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at para 24. 
187 Ibid. para 14. 
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evidence-based and democratically accountable.”190 The Court held that it must pay particular 
attention to the reasons offered by the review panel because “the element of ‘justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process’ takes on a heightened 
importance in [the context of environmental assessment].”191 It thus imposed a robust 
requirement of public justification on the review panel.   
 
Martin Olszynski describes this decision as a welcome, albeit belated, acknowledgment of 
the proper role of environmental assessment: enabling democratic accountability by informing 
the public of whether a project will result in significant adverse environmental effects, on the 
basis of which the electorate can hold Cabinet to account for approving the project.192 He rightly 
points out that the direction of the reasons in an environmental assessment is to the public (rather 
than simply to Cabinet).193 Indeed, environmental assessment, understood in this sense, 
exemplifies how compliance with the rule of law goes hand-in-hand with democratic 
accountability. In contrast to the formal conception of the rule of law, the requirement of public 
justification makes democratic values internal to the rule of law itself.194 It embodies the 
democratic values of participation and accountability, and enables citizens to understand, 
deliberate about, and contest public decisions. 
                                                            
190 2014 FC 463 at para 237. 
191 Ibid. para 272 quoting Dunsmuir, supra note 176 and Khosa, supra note 172, citation omitted. 
192 Olszynski, supra note 189.  
193 This would also be the case for the ‘justification’ for a project approval in the face of significant adverse 
environmental effects: Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 or in the prior Act that 
was at issue in Greenpeace (Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, s37). To be clear however, 
from the perspective of common law constitutionalism, the direction of the reasons is to the public, not because of 
the statutory language, but because it is the public that will be affected by the decision and therefore its interests 
need to be reflected in the decision.  
194 ‘Justification’, supra note 13 at 34. 
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ii. Institutional Experimentation 
 Common law constitutionalism frees the rule of law from the confines of a strict doctrine 
of the separation of powers. The separation of powers, like any institutional design, is only useful 
to the extent that it enables the realization of foundational constitutional principles.195 This, 
Dyzenhaus argues, allows the requirement of justification to be fulfilled even in times of crisis 
where government claims of secrecy and national security privilege interfere with judicial 
scrutiny of emergency response decisions.196 For example, Dyzenhaus points to a special 
immigration appeals tribunal in the United Kingdom in charge of reviewing deportation 
decisions, that but for sensitive information pertaining to national security, would be reviewed by 
the court.197 The tribunal has expertise in national security, immigration, and law, and has special 
powers to allow government claims of secrecy to be tested in closed proceedings.198 To be sure, 
the procedures are far from perfect,199 but they can be understood as a commitment to public 
justification. The tribunal ensures that the executive’s deportation decision is justified, and in 
turn the court ensures that the tribunal’s decision is justified.200 The court must also justify its 
decision on the basis of fundamental common law principles.201 Thus, judicial review need not be 
conceived of as an all-or-nothing endeavour where judges are torn between abdication or second-
guessing national security decisions. Rather, it can be understood as a more nuanced role where 
the court ensures that other institutions of government are maintaining their commitment to the 
                                                            
195 David Dyzenhaus, "Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law" (2002) 27 
Queen's LJ 445 at 451 [‘Values’]. 
196 Constitution, supra note 51 at 174-90. 
197 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 s 2 (UK). 
198 Constitution, supra note 22 at 163. 
199 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] QB 415. Sullivan J. (overturned by the Court of 
Appeal) described the special advocates procedure as creating a “thin veneer of legality”. Numerous lawyers acting 
as special advocates, representing the claimant’s interests in the closed proceedings, have quit because of the 
inadequacy of the process: Clare Dyer, “Terror QC: more will quit special court” The Guardian (20 December 
2004) online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/dec/20/terrorism.humanrights>. 
200 Constitution, supra note 51 at 178. Though Dyzenhaus makes clear that his is an aspirational account, since the 
role of judicial review that he describes is one that judges tend to struggle with. 
201 ‘Values’, supra note 195 at 501-2. 
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rule of law,202 understood as a requirement to publicly justify decisions on the basis of core 
constitutional principles. 
 
 Dyzenhaus’ example of how institutional experimentation can ensure that the 
requirement of justification can be fulfilled in emergencies holds important potential for 
understanding how the rule of law can respond to the environmental emergency. And, while 
analogous environmental appeals tribunals are common in Canadian environmental law,203 there 
is much potential for environmental issues to contribute to a far-reaching elaboration of common 
law constitutionalism. Outside the adjudicative context, Dyzenhaus gestures toward the 
American example of the notice-and-comment process for administrative rulemaking,204 as an 
illustration of procedures that promote the culture of justification.205 Notice-and-comment 
procedure requires administrative agencies to provide public notice of proposed regulations, 
solicit public comment, and issue a rationale statement that reflects consideration of public 
comments and offers a public-regarding justification for the decision.206 The procedure embodies 
the values of participation and accountability by ensuring that the decision-making process is 
both open and responsive to the broader political community, not simply the narrower range of 
parties and interests that would be represented in an adjudication.  
 
                                                            
202 See also Sossin, supra note 137 at 687. 
203 See, for example, Jerry V DeMarco and Paul R Valdoon, Environmental Boards and Tribunals in Canada: A 
Practical Guide (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2011; Mark Haddock, Environmental Tribunals in British Columbia 
(Victoria: Environmental Law Centre, University of Victoria, 2011). Their mandates, procedures and functions are 
diverse, thus, the extent to which any given tribunal is capable of fulfilling the requirement of justification depends 
on its specific context. Common criticisms include: limited standing for parties that are not the regulated party, 
licensing decisions are only appealable at time of initial issue, not when licenses are amended or renewed (Ibid. at 
26-7), and the fact that entire environmental statutes, or public interest perspectives fall outside the scope of existing 
institutions (Ibid. at 23). 
204 5 U.S.C. (s) 553. 
205 ‘Justification’, supra note 13 at 35; Criddle, supra note 167 at 1276. 
206 Ibid. 
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 Despite its technocratic origins, the Chief Forester’s process for determining the 
allowable harvest now incorporates notice-and-comment requirements. The results of a technical 
review are made accessible to the public and form the basis for public comment.207 After two 
rounds of public comment and aboriginal consultation, the Chief Forester makes the final 
determination208 and publishes a Rationale Statement detailing his reasons for the decision.209 
Although the process was abridged in some cases at the height of the mountain pine beetle 
epidemic, the basic elements of notice, public comment, and reasons for the Chief Forester’s 
decision remained intact.210  
 
 Perhaps a more interesting example of how institutional design can maintain public 
justification in the complex environmental context is British Columbia’s Forest Practices Board. 
The Board is the province’s independent ‘forestry watchdog’211 which exercises a range of 
specialized functions, including the jurisdiction to undertake comprehensive and systematic 
reviews of broader issues of forest policy. Its scope of review is therefore not limited by the 
adjudicatory process and the Board can tailor its review to the particular environmental issue it 
addresses. Its members have expertise in forestry, biology and law, and the Board’s purpose is to 
promote accountability within the forest sector by overseeing both government enforcement and 
industry compliance with the Forest and Range Management Act.212 The Board has a variety of 
statutory powers including auditing, responding to complaints and initiating internal reviews or 
                                                            
207 Timber Supply Review Backgrounder (Victoria: Government of British Columbia, 2013) online: British Columbia 
Ministry of Forests 
<http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/pubs/tsr/Timber%20Supply%20Review%20Backgrounder_Nov_2013.pdf> 
208 Ibid. at 2-3. 
209 Ibid. at 3. 
210 Prince George TSA (2004), Morice TSA (2008), Williams Lake TSA (2007) and 100 Mile House TSA (2006). 
All information is publicly available on the Ministry’s website: <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hts/aactsa.htm>. 
211 Hon Andrew Petter, Hansard Vol 15, No 21, May 30, 1994 at 11172. 
212 Forest and Range Practices Act, SBC 2002, c 69 s 136 [FRPA].  
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appeals of government decisions.213 In addition, the Board is charged with the task of conducting 
comprehensive special investigations on matters of public importance.214  
 
The Board conducted a series of special investigations on the government’s response to 
the mountain pine beetle epidemic, and in doing so, demonstrated its ability to thoroughly vet the 
government’s claims that exceptional emergency response actions were necessary to respond to 
the epidemic. For example, the government based its initial response to the beetle on the 
assumption that aggressively clearcutting infested stands and the surrounding area could control 
and suppress the epidemic. The Forest Practices Board reviewed this assumption and determined 
that, although it was reasonable and did have a modest affect on the epidemic, the better 
approach in heavily-attacked forests was to switch to salvage harvesting.215 The government 
changed its harvest strategy in accordance with the Board’s recommendation.216 Moreover, the 
Board has played an important role in exposing the many ecological impacts of the mountain 
pine beetle response, such as the effects of heavy salvage logging on streamflows and 
biodiversity,217 and assuaging public concerns that industry had opportunistically over-harvested 
unaffected tree species.218  
 
In short, a common law constitutional conception of the rule of law emphasizes creative 
institutional design to ensure that all government decisions are publicly justified. Many examples 
                                                            
213 FRPA, supra note 212 ss 81, 83, 122-125. 
214 FRPA, supra note 212 s 122(1)(b). 
215 Evaluating, supra note 34 at 33. 
216 Nelson, supra note 37 at 464. 
217 Forest Practices Board, The Effect of Mountain Pine Beetle Attack and Salvage Harvesting on Streamflows 
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218 Forest Practices Board, Tree Species Harvested in Areas Affected by Mountain Pine Beetle (Victoria: Forest 
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of creative institutional design are already in place in Canadian environmental law, but the extent 
to which they can – and do – fulfill this conception of the rule of law is part of a much broader 
project. The fact that environmental law remains mired in the formal conception suggests that 
these aspects of institutional design have been largely undervalued from the perspective of 
maintaining the rule of law.219  
V. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that understanding the nature of the relationship between law and 
the environment requires viewing environmental issues as an ongoing emergency. It argued that 
environmental issues possess the constitutive features of an emergency: they contain the 
ineliminable possibility of an unforeseeable, catastrophic threat. The environmental emergency 
does not offer a solution to any or all environmental issues, perhaps least of all the mountain pine 
beetle epidemic. Rather, it is a way of understanding how environmental decision-making can 
better align with our commitment to democratic values and the rule of law.  
 
 But this framework of the ‘environmental emergency,’ no doubt, raises more questions 
than it answers. Acknowledging the potential of institutional design is only the first step in 
articulating how the common law constitutional conception of the rule of law can be fulfilled in 
environmental law. With common law constitutionalism’s focus on the adjudicative context, it is 
not immediately clear that its core principles of fairness, equality and reasonableness can find the 
                                                            
219 See, e.g., Western Canada Wilderness Committee v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations) 2014 BCSC 808 where, despite concluding that the Forest Practices Board is the appropriate forum for 
review, it goes onto hold that the Minister’s decision was legally valid. 
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same expression in the primarily administrative context of environmental decision-making.220 
The environmental emergency highlights the importance of this next task of determining what 
common law constitutionalism requires in the policy-laden context of environmental law.221 One 
promising avenue is the overlap between Dyzenhaus’s requirement of public justification and the 
right to justification derived from theories of deliberative democracy.222 Indeed, the central tenets 
of deliberative democracy – e.g. consensus, reason, and equality ⁠ – serve the same underlying 
democratic values of participation and accountability as the common law constitutional 
conception of the rule of law. And the potential for theories of deliberative democracy to better 
orient administrative policymaking toward these democratic values has already been noted in 
other contexts.223 Redefining environmental law through the framework of the environmental 
emergency opens up these new avenues for understanding the role of law in the governance of 
environmental decision-making, while, at the same time, keeps in plain sight the profound 
challenges that serious environmental issues pose for the rule of law. 
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